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9 Technology Transfer in the 
Asian Pacific Region: 
Implications of Trends 
since the Mid-1980s 
Tran Van Tho 
In the past quarter century, the Asian Pacific region has experienced rapid 
economic growth characterized by rapid industrialization. Not only Asian 
newly industrialized economies (NIEs) but also many Association of South- 
east Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries and China have shown a substantial 
rise in the manufacturing sector as a percentage share of GDP or total exports. 
These facts imply that the structure of comparative advantage of each coun- 
try and thus the pattern of specialization in the region have changed over time. 
In fact, for example, Taiwan and Korea have increasingly penetrated Japan’s 
domestic market for capital and technology-intensive products, and two-way 
trade in manufactured products between Japan and ASEAN and between Ja- 
pan and China has increased substantially. The share of manufactured prod- 
ucts in Japan’s total imports from ASEAN-4 (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Phil- 
ippines, and Thailand) has risen from 6 percent in 1980 to 14 percent in 1987 
and 23 percent in 1989. The corresponding figures for Japanese imports from 
China in the same years were 22,  40, and 52 percent, respectively.’ 
Behind the process of catching up by Asian Pacific developing countries in 
manufacturing production and exports have been changes in the factor endow- 
ments of each country. For latecomers to industrialization, this means that 
capital/labor ratios and technological levels have risen over time. In addition 
to the domestic accumulation of capital and technological development, capi- 
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tal movement and technology transfer from other countries have promoted 
changes in the factor endowments of Asian Pacific developing countries. In 
particular, since the mid-l980s, factor movement from Japan to these coun- 
tries has accelerated, and Asian NIEs have increasingly participated in the 
supply of capital and technology in the region. 
This paper focuses on the role of technology transfer in the industrialization 
of the Asian Pacific region. It will provide some observations on the trends in 
the second half of the 1980s and discuss their implications for the future in- 
dustrialization and division of labor in the region. In this paper, the Asian 
Pacific region is defined as including Japan, Asian NIEs, ASEAN, China, and 
Vietnam, but the last two countries will not be examined in detail. I will also 
confine my discussion to the manufacturing sector. 
In what follows, section 9.1 will summarize the characteristics and effects 
of the channels through which technologies are transferred. In particular, 
some controversial issues regarding the relationship between foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and technology transfer will be discussed. In section 9.2, 
the pattern of Japan’s technology transfer in the region since the mid- 1980s 
will be analyzed. The “push factors” for the expansion of Japanese FDI as 
well as other channels of technology transfer will also be discussed. Section 
9.3 highlights recent trends in the role of Asian NIEs as new transmitters of 
technology in the region via the channel of direct investment. The factors 
pushing firms in NIEs to expand FDI will also be mentioned. Section 9.4 will 
discuss the nature of the Asian Pacific region as a market for technologies 
from Japan and NIEs. In other words, the “pull factors” accounting for the 
expansion of direct investment and other flows of technology will be ana- 
lyzed. In section 9.5, the implications of new trends in technology transfer 
will be discussed in the dynamic context of the Asian Pacific economies. Fi- 
nally, section 9.6 will summarize my major conclusions. 
9.1 Channels of Technology lkansfer 
In this paper, technology is defined in a broad sense to include not only 
production technology (hardware of production or knowledge about machines 
and processes) but also management expertise, marketing skills, and other 
intangible corporate assets. 
Technologies can be internationally transferred through many channels. 
Broadly speaking, these channels can be divided into two categories, public 
and private. In the first category, technologies can be considered as public 
goods, and the transfer is conducted by public organizations, such as govern- 
ments of advanced countries and international agencies. Such technologies are 
seen in fields such as agriculture and government administration, where mar- 
kets for technologies do not exist. The transfer is conducted as a part of the 
technical assistance or economic cooperation provided to developing coun- 
tries. By contrast, private channels of transfer relate to technologies that are 
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developed by private firms and transferred on a commercial basis. The owners 
or suppliers of technologies are usually, but not always, multinational corpo- 
rations (MNCs). The scope of this paper is limited to private channels of tech- 
nology transfer. 
Technology transfer by MNCs or other private firms is conducted through 
the following channels: (foreign) direct investment (FDI), licensing arrange- 
ments, plant export, original equipment manufacturing (OEM), and others.2 
FDI involves the transfer of a package of managerial resources including pro- 
duction technology, management know-how, and marketing skills. Other 
channels of transfer do not involve such packaging and have drawn wide at- 
tention since the late 1970s as “new forms” of MNCs’ involvement in devel- 
oping countries (Oman 1984). 
The importance of each channel varies, depending on the strategy of the 
MNC supplying the technologies, the characteristics of the technologies 
themselves, and the policies, absorptive capacity, and managerial resource en- 
dowments of the recipient countries. 
The preference of MNCs for one channel or another depends on many fac- 
tors. If the technologies are newly developed, MNCs prefer direct investment 
with majority ownership to an arm’s length transaction because majority own- 
ership allows them to control use of the technologies, preventing the leakage 
of technology to third parties. Another determinant of the channel used is the 
firm’s perception of the environment in the recipient country. If the environ- 
ment is considered risky, licensing arrangements may be chosen since, with 
this channel, the MNC’s level of commitment in the market is much lower 
than in the case of direct investment. In the case of OEM, the technological 
levels of the recipient firms are crucial since the products made by the latter 
as a result of technology transfer will be sold under the brand name of the 
transferring MNC. 
From the standpoint of developing recipients, FDI may be the most effec- 
tive channel for the development of a new industry since developing countries 
tend to be poorly endowed with management and marketing skills. However, 
if the technology is standardized and product markets are stable, recipient 
countries may prefer other channels that do not involve control by foreign 
firms. When the preferences of MNCs and recipients do not coincide, their 
respective bargaining power will determine which channel of technology 
transfer is ultimately used. 
Since the remainder of this paper will focus on FDI, it seems fitting to 
discuss here the relation between FDI and technology transfer and the various 
controversies surrounding this issue. 
In Asia, there have been complaints that Japan is passive in transferring 
2. Other channels of technology transfer not dealt with in this paper include turn key contract, 
franchising, and international subcontracting. For a more detailed discussion of channels of tech- 
nology transfer and related issues, see, e.g., UNCTC (1987). 
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technology to the region’s developing countries. The complaints can be di- 
vided into two types. In the first type, Japanese firms are said to be unwilling 
to transfer technology (the technologies that Asian countries want); that is, no 
technology is transferred under any channel. This is a complaint often heard 
in Korea regarding the passive attitude of Japanese firms toward the transfer 
of recent high-technology developments in Japan. It is true that Japanese firms 
prefer to keep new technologies at home and serve foreign markets by export- 
ing products from Japan. But, when Japanese firms decide to provide or trans- 
fer the technology to foreign countries, they will choose one of the channels 
discussed above. FDI is one of those channels. It can thus be implicitly as- 
sumed that FDI represents technology transfer. This leads to the second type 
of complaint from Asia, namely, that, even when Japanese firms do undertake 
FDI, they do not really transfer technology. This complaint is often heard 
from Thailand, Malaysia, and other Southeast Asian countries. 
More concretely, firms affiliated with Japan are said to be reluctant to train 
local employees, with the result that there is no smooth transfer of technology. 
Japanese companies allegedly staff their affiliates with too many Japanese 
managers, thus depriving local staff of the opportunity to acquire management 
 skill^.^ However, these claims are often confused by the lack of a clear defini- 
tion of concepts, and thus, in many cases, friction between Japan and other 
Asian countries results from a gap in perception. Let me provide a simple 
framework to understand this problem and summarize the evidence shown by 
a number of surveys, including my own. 
We may divide technologies into three types: production technology, ad- 
ministration technology, and management skills (Ogawa 1976). Accordingly, 
we may divide technology transfer into three levels. Suppose that an MNC 
undertakes an FDI project in a developing country to produce a manufactured 
product. First, a factory is built. The factory is a form that embodies both 
production technology and administration technology. Production technology 
is the combination of equipment and the knowledge to operate that equipment. 
The transfer of this technology requires the transfer of both equipment and 
knowledge-and therefore the training of local operators. 
In the production process, there are many forms of administration: inven- 
tory, quality control, schedule control, facility administration, and so on. The 
transfer of these administration technologies involires the training and educa- 
tion of engineers and managers at middle levels (section chief, department 
head, etc.). 
The third type of technology is the management skills embodied in the head 
office. The head office is usually located in the capital of the host country and 
manages the operations of a factory or a number of factories, and it also di- 
rects all planning, marketing, finance, and other similar activities. High-level 
managers at the head office have to follow the trends in product markets, tech- 
3.  See, e . g . ,  the papers written by Southeast Asian scholars in Sekiguchi (1983). 
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nological change, and other areas and devise strategies that can cope with new 
situations. The transfer of such management skills requires the training of 
high-level managers, who are gradually allowed to fill the top-class manage- 
rial posts initially held by staff from the MNC’s home country. 
The behavior of MNCs regarding the transfer of the three types of technol- 
ogy discussed above can be hypothesized as follows. Regarding production 
technology and administration technology, MNCs have two incentivcs to 
transfer to the host country. First, since the employees and staff at these stages 
are large in number, most of them must be recruited from the local labor mar- 
ket; only a few, if any, are sent from the MNC’s home country, except during 
the initial stage of the operations. Second, in order to run affiliated firms effi- 
ciently, MNCs have to train employees and middle managers so that they can 
operate or manage the factory smoothly. 
Transferring management skills is more complicated. The persons in charge 
of planning or conducting financial and marketing strategies must have high 
levels of managerial knowledge and sometimes must be aware not only of the 
situation of the affiliated firm but also of the global strategy of the MNC as a 
whole. These persons therefore are frequently in contact with headquarters, 
and it is essential that they be able to communicate effectively with the head- 
quarters. If these conditions are not met, MNCs have the incentive to send 
staff from the parent headquarters to fill the top managerial posts of the affili- 
ates. 
The evidence so far has confirmed the point that there is a relatively large 
number of Japanese expatriates in the joint ventures or subsidiaries of Japa- 
nese firms. However, this does not necessarily mean that there is a lack of 
technology transfer. In many cases, it may mean the reverse, particularly in 
the initial stage of the investment project. The important problem here is 
whether the number of Japanese staff has declined steadily over time as a 
result of the transfer of technology to local staff. 
The results of my field surveys (Tran 1992) on the operation of Japanese 
affiliates in the synthetic fiber industry in Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and In- 
donesia can be summarized as follows. First, in the case of production and 
administration technologies, Japanese firms have been active in training local 
employees, for example, by sending middle managers to Japan for training 
courses, by conducting on-the-job training, and by other activities. With these 
efforts, the transfer has been quite smooth. The number of Japanese staff at 
various managerial levels in the factory has been reduced steadily without 
interruption or major trouble in the operations. Second, there has, however, 
been no significant progress evinced in the transfer of management skills. This 
is particularly true for Thailand and Indonesia. 
A survey by MITI (1989a, 21-22) also shows that, in the Japanese-affiliated 
firms in Asia, a substantial reduction in the number of Japanese staff was re- 
corded at middle-management levels but not at higher levels. 
What are the reasons for the differential transfer rates between the factory 
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(the transfer of production and administrative technologies) and the head of- 
fice (the transfer of management skills)? The quick transfer of production and 
administrative technologies can be explained by the cost and efficiency con- 
siderations of MNCs, as discussed earlier. The slow transfer of managerial 
posts may be attributed to the following four factors. 
First, as noted earlier, communication between affiliated firms and the par- 
ent headquarters must be conducted smoothly. Because of language barriers, 
Japanese firms are reluctant to give high-level managerial posts to local staff. 
Second, one of the major features of the Japanese management style is to 
grant managerial posts only to those employees who, after entering the com- 
pany as university graduates, have worked their way up through the ranks, 
serving in various positions within the company for many years. Under such 
a system of intrafirm training and promotion, it takes about twenty years or 
more for an employee to reach a high managerial post. 
Third, in the case where Japanese firms modify their management style and 
are willing to recruit qualified persons from the local labor market, it is essen- 
tial that the supply side of that market meet the demand. However, in many 
developing countries, the shortage of qualified high-level managers is still a 
serious problem. 
Fourth, in some Asian countries, the efforts of local partners to catch up 
(using local replacements for foreign managerial resources) have been weak. 
In many cases, local shareholders simply prefer to maximize the dividends 
from the joint ventures and thus discourage the localization of management 
since local managers are usually thought to be less efficient than Japanese 
ones. 
In the case of Korea and Taiwan, the third and fourth factors have been 
small; that is, the local supply of human resources has expanded over time, 
and local efforts to catch up by replacing foreign managerial resources have 
been strong (Tran 1988). In addition, owning to historical factors, linguistic 
similarity, and educational access, Koreans and Taiwanese have an advantage 
in studying and learning the Japanese language. This point, together with 
many common cultural values in Far East Asia, has lowered the communica- 
tion barriers between Japan and the two Asian NIEs. For these reasons, so 
long as FDI is undertaken, the transfer of management skills from Japan to 
Korea and Taiwan has been considerable. It is interesting to note that the 
claims that Japanese firms undertake FDI but do not transfer technology (man- 
agement skills) have been heard from Southeast Asian countries but almost 
never from Asian NIEs. 
Given the scope of this paper, I shall go no further on this point. I simply 
need to confirm here that FDI is a channel of technology transfer. When FDI 
is undertaken, it involves technology transfer, at least at the factory As 
4. According to MITI (1986, 591), in 1983 about 95 percent of production technologies used 
in Japanese affiliates in Asia were supplied by Japan. For affiliates in electronics and other 
machinery-related industries, such figures were in the range of 97-99 percent. 
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far as management skills are concerned, even when FDI does not involve a 
localization of such technology, management operations must nevertheless be 
moved from the MNC’s home country to the host country. Therefore, FDI 
results in an increase in the production capacity in host countries, changes in 
the location of industrial activities, and, consequently, a change in the division 
of labor among home and host countries of MNCs. 
9.2 lkends in Japan’s Technology lkansfer in Asia: Pattern and 
Factors 
9.2.1 Foreign Direct Investment 
Since late 1985, when the value of the yen began to increase sharply, Ja- 
pan’s FDI has rapidly expanded. Japanese manufacturing firms have ventured 
overseas at high speed. On a reported (to the Ministry of Finance) basis, Jap- 
anese FDI in world manufacturing industries reached U.S. $3.8 billion in fis- 
cal 1986 (an expansion of 62 percent over the previous fiscal year), U.S. $7.8 
billion in 1987 (an expansion of 106 percent), U.S. $13.8 billion in 1988, and 
U.S. $16.3 billion in 1989. 
Along with these general trends, investment in Asia has also shown a high 
rate of expansion since 1986. For all manufacturing industries as a whole, the 
cumulative investment in the most recent four years exceeded the cumulative 
investment from 1951 to 1985 (see Table 9.1). The rapid appreciation of the 
yen has significantly changed the structure of Japan’s international competi- 
tiveness. Wages and other factor costs in Japan, in dollar terms, rose rapidly 
owing to the drastic change in the value of the yen. In 1986, Japanese wages, 
for instance, were about four times higher than the average level in Asian 
NIEs and about thirteen times higher than in ASEAN countries (MITI 1988, 
13). Given the still higher value of the yen in subsequent years, factor costs in 
Japan in the late 1980s should have been much higher than in 1986. As a 
result, many industries have had to venture overseas in order to achieve lower 
production costs. Until mid-1986, Asian NIEs, particularly Taiwan and South 
Korea, were the major markets absorbing these new direct investments. Since 
mid-1986, the waves have spread to ASEAN, especially Thailand and Malay- 
sia. Since 1987, Japanese direct investment in Indonesia has also risen sub- 
stantially. These investments include not only the establishment of new 
wholly owned subsidiaries or joint ventures but also the expansion of produc- 
tion (including the addition of new product lines) by existing ventures. 
Three features of the Japanese manufacturing sector’s direct investment in 
Asia since the mid-1980s may be noted. First, the industrial structure of Jap- 
anese FDI in the region has been significantly upgraded in the sense that the 
weight of more technologically sophisticated industries has risen consider- 
ably. This is partially reflected in the increasingly strong presence of the elec- 
trical and electronics industries. In the most recent four years, those industries 
accounted for more than 30 percent of the total Japanese manufacturing direct 
250 %an Van Tho 
~ ~~ ~ 
Table 9.1 Japanese Manufacturing Direct Investment in Asia (million U.S. dollars) 
Asia ASEAN-4 Asian NIEs 
1951-85 1986-89 
All manufacturing 
Foodstuffs 
Textiles 
Pulp and paper 
Chemicals 
Steel and nonferrous 
General machinery 
metals 
Electrical machinery 
Transport equipment 
Others 
7,517 
(100.0) 
256 
(3.4) 
1,182 
(15.7) 
191 
(2.5) 
1,292 
(17.2) 
1,697 
(22.6) 
580 
(7.7) 
833 
(11.1) 
692 
796 
(10.6) 
(9.2) 
8,074 
(100.0) 
795 
(9.8) 
387 
(4.8) 
260 
(3.2) 
786 
(9.7) 
88 1 
(10.9) 
806 
2,515 
(31.1) 
633 
(7.8) 
1,010 
(12.5) 
(10.0) 
1951-86 1987-89 
4,207 3,618 
(100.0) (100.0) 
165 136 
(3.9) (3.8) 
825 176 
(19.6) (4.9) 
163 223 
(3.9) (6.2) 
438 276 
(10.4) (7.6) 
1,494 579 
(35.5) (16.0) 
133 409 
(3.2) (11.3) 
245 1,200 
( 5 . 8 )  (33.2) 
392 230 
(9.3) (6.4) 
352 387 
(8.4) (10.7) 
1951-86 1987-89 
3,891 3,001 
(100.0) (100.0) 
90 595 
(2.3) (19.8) 
366 67 
(9.4) (2.2) 
31 21 
(0.8) (.7) 
876 432 
(22.5) (14.4) 
23 1 220 
(5.9) (7.3) 
585 242 
(15.0) (8.1) 
829 807 
(21.3) (26.9) 
386 239 
(9.9) (8.0) 
548 38 1 
(14.1) (12.7) 
Source: Calculated from data released by the Ministry of Finance (Japan). 
Nore: Attention should be paid to the differences in the periods covered under “Asia” compared with 
those covered under “ASEAN-4 and “Asian NIEs,” differences due to data availability. Figures in 
parentheses are share of each industry in all manufacturing. 
investment in Asia, compared with 11 percent for the preceding period (table 
9.1). In contrast, labor-intensive industries, typically textiles, and resource- 
intensive industries, such as chemicals and steel and nonferrous metals, have 
shown a sharp decline in their share of Japanese FDI. The exceptional case is 
foodstuffs, an industry that is considered labor intensive. Its share rose sharply 
in the second period. This was due, however, to the merger and acquisition 
of a large firm in Singapore by a Japanese manufacturer of alcoholic bever- 
ages in 1989. In terms of statistical data, this case has biased the struc- 
ture of the Japanese manufacturing sector’s direct investment in Asian NIEs 
(table 9.1). 
The steady expansion of direct investment by Japan’s electrical/electronics 
industry has been increasingly accompanied by the transfer of high technol- 
ogy. Until the early 1980s, firms tended to transfer standardized or low-level 
technologies such as those relating to the assembly of black-and-white televi- 
sion sets or to simple electronics parts. In recent years, however, Japanese 
firms have increased the transfer of technologies relating to sophisticated elec- 
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tronic parts, the production of color televisions, videocassette recorders, and 
other areas. 
FDI from other industries has also been characterized by the transfer of high 
technology. In the case of Japanese direct investment in Korea’s chemical in- 
dustry, for example, the number of such high-tech projects as biotechnology 
and pharmaceuticals has increased (JETRO 1991, 146). Somsak (1991) also 
documented the fact that Japanese direct investment in Thailand has markedly 
increased in the fields of capital goods and intermediate electronic and electri- 
cal products. 
The second feature of Japan’s manufacturing sector’s direct investment in 
Asia in recent years has been the increasing export orientation of investment 
projects. The rapid appreciation of the yen has forced Japanese firms to locate 
their manufacturing production activities overseas as a substitute for exports, 
on the one hand, and for sourcing cheaper products to serve their domestic 
markets, on the other. According to a MITI survey (1989a) of the markets for 
the products of Japanese manufacturing subsidiaries in Asia, 15.8 percent of 
the sales of those firms were shipped back to the Japanese market in 1986, 
compared to 10.8 percent in 1983; furthermore, 29.5 percent were exported 
to third countries, compared to 22.3 percent in 1983. For electrical and elec- 
tronic products, third-country markets have been much more important than 
for manufacturing industries as a whole. According to another survey by MITI 
(1987, 269) on the purposes of direct investment projects undertaken after 
1985 in Asian NIEs by Japan’s electrical/electronics industry, 14.8 percent of 
the outputs were shipped back to the Japanese market, another 41.6 percent 
were exported to third countries, and only 43.6 percent were sold in local 
markets. Data from recipient countries such as Thailand (Somsak 1991) and 
Indonesia (Thee 1990) also show the same trends. 
The third feature is the increasing presence of small and medium-sized 
firms (SMSFs). As shown in table 9.2, SMSFs accounted for more than half 
the FDI projects undertaken by Japanese firms in recent years. The table also 
shows that about two-thirds of manufacturing FDI projects undertaken by 
SMSFs have been concentrated in Asia. In particular, the concentration of 
investment in Asia by four manufacturing sectors, namely, machinery, tex- 
tiles, metals, and miscellaneous goods, is prominent (Adachi 1991). Because 
of the rapid appreciation of the value of the yen, many SMSFs have sought 
low-cost production sites in Asia. Some of them are subcontractors of large 
firms in Japan and have undertaken FDI at the request of their parent firms, 
which want to ensure the supply of parts and components in the latter’s Asian 
assembly plants. 
Since the technological gap between developing countries and SMSFs of 
advanced countries can be hypothesized to be smaller than that between de- 
veloping countries and larger firms, the technologies of Japanese SMSFs can 
be easily transferred to and diffused throughout Asia. This point will be dis- 
cussed in more detail in section 9.5 below. 
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Table 9.2 Rends in Japanese FDI by SMSFs (%) 
1980 1985 1988 1989 
Share of SMSFs in all Japanese FDI projects 41.3 31.1 59.6 53.8 
Share of manufacturing investment in all FDI 
Share of Asia in all manufacturing FDI by 
projects by SMSFs 30.4 43.1 44.5 38.2 
SMSFs: 57.6 63.5 65.6 64.7 
Of which: 
N I E s - ~ ~  36.4 30.7 26.8 20.4 
21.1 8.1 7.9 
Other Asia 11.7 30.7 36.4 
China 21.2 
Source: Small and Medium Enterprises Agency, White Paper on Small and Medium Enterprises (Tokyo: 
Ministry of Finance, various years). 
“Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. 
9.2.2 Other Channels of Technology Transfer from Japan 
Direct investment has not been the only channel of technology transfer from 
Japan. Since the mid-l980s, other channels have been adopted, including li- 
censing arrangements, production cooperation, and OEM. Japanese firms 
seem to adopt different channels of technology transfer depending on the gen- 
eral technological level as well as the degree of political or economic risk in 
host countries. Table 9.3 provides some evidence for this point. The table 
summarizes the forms (channels) of technology transfer by Japanese firms 
during the first two and a half years since the value of the yen started its sharp 
rise. The table suggests that direct investment is important in Asian NIEs and 
ASEAN countries while licensing arrangements and production cooperation 
have been chosen mainly for the Chinese market. OEM has so far appeared 
only in Asian NIEs. This may be explained by the relatively high technologi- 
cal levels of firms in NIEs, compared to those in other Asian developing coun- 
tries. Along with the accumulation of managerial resources, many firms in 
NIEs have preferred OEM-type technology transfers over FDI, which results 
in management control by MNCS.~  In terms of the cost of buying technology, 
OEM is also much cheaper than licensing arrangements are. From the point 
of view of Japanese firms, the attainment of a high technological level by 
firms in NIEs is a precondition for transfer through the OEM channel because 
of the need to ensure product quality, as mentioned in section 9.1 above. The 
reason why licensing arrangements have been the most important channel of 
technology transfer for China may be that China is considered by Japanese 
firms to be much riskier than NIEs or ASEAN countries because of the possi- 
5 .  About 30 of the firms surveyed by MITI (1989a. 122-23) have conducted OEM in Asia and 
other regions. The most important reason for choosing this channel of technology transfer is said 
to have been “requests” from recipient firms. 
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Table 9.3 Forms of Technology ’kansfer to Asia by Japanese Firms, 1986-June 1988 
(no. of cases) 
Local Production Licensing Production 
(direct investment) Arrangement Cooperation OEM 
Korea 
Taiwan 
Hong Kong 
Singapore 
Asian NIEs (A) 
Thailand 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Indonesia 
ASEAN-4 (B) 
127 98 44 9 
209 51 43 8 
39 5 9 1 
113 3 4 0 
488 158 100 18 
129 21 6 0 
62 5 2 0 
28 5 2 0 
45 16 8 0 
264 47 18 0 
China (C) 85 107 38 1 
Asian Pacific (A + B + C) 837 312 156 19 
Source: Compiled from NEEDS system of the Japan Economic Journal (Nihon Keizui Shinbun). 
Table 9.4 Channels of Technology ’kansfer from Japan to Asia 
N % 
Total projects surveyed 856 100.0 
FDI 471 55.7 
Licensing arrangements 341 40.5 
Other channels 32 3.1 
Source: Survey by Nikkei Research Institute of Industry and Markets, Tokyo, October 1990. 
Note: The survey covered only four machinery-related industries: general machinery, electrical/ 
electronic products, automobiles, and precision machinery. 
bility of changes in foreign and domestic economic policies as a result of 
changes in the political situation. 
Table 9.4 gives the results of a survey of 474 Japanese manufacturers in 
four machinery-related industries (general machinery, electrical/electronics, 
transport equipment, and precision machinery). According to the survey, 342 
firms had conducted a total of 856 projects involving technology transfer in 
Asian countries (including NIEs, ASEAN, China, India, and Pakistan) by 
October 1990. Even though India and Pakistan were included in the survey, 
these two countries together accounted for only 10 percent of the total number 
of technology transfer projects. Table 9.4 shows that both FDI and licensing 
arrangements have been important channels of technology transfer by Japa- 
nese machinery-related producers to Asian countries. Most projects involving 
“other” channels have probably been conducted in recent years. Table 9.5 
breaks down all projects according to transferee and timing of the transfer. 
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Table 9.5 Technology Tkansfer from Japan to Asia 
Total No. Before 1986- 
of Projects 1970 I97 1-80 1981-85 Oct. 1990 
Korea 
Taiwan 
Hong Kong 
Singapore 
Thailand 
Malaysia 
Indonesia 
Philippines 
China 
Asia total 
I95 
( 100.0) 
I55 
( 100 .O) 
14 
(100.0) 
47 
(100.0) 
109 
(100.0) 
89 
(100.0) 
63 
(100.0) 
31 
(100.0) 
68 
(100.0) 
856 
(100.0) 
9 
(4.6) 
25 
(16.1) 
4 
(28.6) 
0 
(.O) 
11 
(10.1) 
3 
(3.4) 
3 
(4.8) 
2 
(6.5) 
0 
( . O )  
59 
(6.9) 
44 
(22.6) 
28 
(18.1) 
3 
(21.4) 
28 
(59.6) 
21 
(19.3) 
21 
(23.6) 
21 
(33.3) 
10 
(32.3) 
2 
(2.9) 
I87 
(21.8) 
53 
(27.2) 
40 
(25.8) 
2 
(14.3) 
9 
(19.1) 
8 
(7.3) 
17 
(19.1) 
19 
(30.2) 
6 
(19.4) 
36 
(52.9) 
229 
(26.8) 
87 
(44.6) 
59 
(38.1) 
5 
(35.7) 
10 
(21.3) 
63 
(57.8) 
43 
(48.3) 
18 
(28.6) 
11 
(35.5) 
29 
(42.6) 
357 
(41.7) 
Source: See table 9.4. 
Note: “Asia total” includes India and Pakistan, which do not appear in this table. “Total no. of 
projects” includes some that were to be conducted in 1991 and some for which the time of transfer 
was unknown. Figures in parentheses show percentage share in total number of projects. See also 
table 9.4. 
Three points emerge from this table. First, Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Ma- 
laysia have been the major markets for Japan’s machinery-related technolo- 
gies, followed by China and Indonesia. Second, for most countries, about 40 
percent or more of the projects were conducted during the latest five-year pe- 
riod. This, again, confirms the aggressive behavior of Japanese firms regard- 
ing technology transfer to Asia following the sharp rise in the value of the 
yen. Third, the concentration of technology transfer in that period was more 
pronounced in ASEAN countries like Thailand and Malaysia than in NIEs 
such as Taiwan and Korea. Since machinery-related technologies can be con- 
sidered to be more sophisticated than those found in other industries such as 
textiles and foodstuffs, this suggests that Japanese firms have an increasingly 
strong interest in exporting high technologies to ASEAN’s growing econo- 
mies. 
In sum, since the latter half of the 1980s, technology transfer by Japanese 
firms of all sizes to the Asian Pacific region has been actively conducted 
through various channels. Among the technologies transferred, sophisticated 
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technologies such as those relating to electrical and electronic products have 
played an increasingly important role. 
9.3 Asian NIEs as the New lkansmitters of Technology: Pattern and 
Factors 
Along with the intensive movement of technologies from Japan, the Asian 
Pacific economy has also been characterized by the active transfer of mana- 
gerial resources from Asian NIEs since the second half of the 1980s. To pro- 
vide a simple picture of that phenomenon, this section will review the pattern 
of direct investment (the major channel of technology transfer) from Taiwan 
and Korea to ASEAN countries.6 
9.3.1 
Taiwan started FDI as early as 1959, but until around 1980 the annual FDI 
level was very small. Substantial FDI occurred in the early 1980s, and annual 
direct investment abroad expanded rapidly after the middle of the decade. The 
cumulative FDI for the two decades between 1959 and 1980 was only U.S. 
$100 million, while the same figure for the period 1981-85 was U.S. $1 14 
million. The sum of FDI conducted during the two subsequent years, 1986 
and 1987, was an even higher U.S. $160 million. At the end of the decade, 
annual FDI from Taiwan experienced continuing jumps: from U.S. $219 mil- 
lion in 1988, to U.S. $931 million in 1989, to U.S. $1.6 billion in 1990.’ 
A number of factors have pushed Taiwanese firms to expand investment 
abroad in recent years. These include the rapid rise in wages and other factor 
costs in Taiwan, the increase in the value of the new Taiwan dollar, and trade 
friction with the United States. For these reasons, Taiwanese FDI has so far 
been conducted mainly by manufacturing firms and in the manufacturing sec- 
tor of the recipient countries. In terms of capital stock at the end of 1990, 
about two-thirds of Taiwanese FDI was accounted for by manufacturing in- 
dustries. 
Since the 1980s, more than half of Taiwanese direct investment abroad has 
been concentrated in the United States. However, by 1987, the United States 
has been particularly important for Taiwan’s electrical and electronics indus- 
try. In the area of light manufacturing (labor-intensive industries), for ex- 
The Pattern of Taiwan’s Direct Investment in ASEAN 
6 .  For a short review of other channels of technology transfer from Asian NIEs, see, e.g., Chen 
(1985). This reflects, however, only the situation until the early 1980s. 
7. FDI data released by Taiwanese authorities have usually been underestimated. This has been 
due in part to the fact that some investments were not submitted to the government for approval. 
The government’s review process is usually time consuming, so, in order to avoid possible delays 
in their investment schedules, firms may have bypassed government regulations whenever pos- 
sible. This data problem, however, does not significantly affect the analysis here unless the unre- 
ported FDI has had a pattern quite different from that described in the paper. In fact, so long as the 
magnitude or the amount of FDI is concerned, the underestimation of the data tends to strengthen 
my argument. 
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ample, textiles, apparel, wood products, foodstuffs, and beverages, ASEAN 
countries have been much more important. As shown in table 9.6, light- 
manufacturing industries accounted for about half of Taiwanese direct invest- 
ment in ASEAN, and the investment stock in this region has far exceeded that 
in the United States. In particular, Taiwan’s direct investment in labor- 
intensive industries in Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines has shown a 
high rate of expansion. In the most recent period, from 1988 to 1990, Tai- 
wanese electrical and electronics firms have also conducted substantial direct 
investment in ASEAN countries (table 9.7). However, Taiwanese electronics 
firms’ direct investment in Thailand and other ASEAN countries seemed to be 
involved primarily in the production of highly standardized products such as 
lamps, transformers, and washing-machine motors (Ramstetter 1988, 1 18; 
JETRO 1991, 159). This is quite different from FDI by Japanese electronics 
firms. 
Recently, Taiwanese light manufacturers have also been active in direct in- 
vestment in Vietnam, which promulgated a new foreign investment law in 
January 1988.8 
As a result of active direct investment since the latter half of the 1980s, 
Taiwanese capital and technology have now gained a significant position in 
most ASEAN countries. Until the mid-l980s, in terms of FDI, the position of 
Taiwan as a capital supplier was negligible in most ASEAN countries, except 
for Thailand. However, the cumulative investment in recent years shows that 
Taiwan has become the largest supplier of managerial resources in Malaysia, 
the second (but close to first) largest supplier in Indonesia, and the third (but 
close to second) largest supplier in Thailand (see table 9.8).’ 
Since FDI involves the transfer of a package of production technologies, 
management skills, and marketing skills, the growth and the industry compo- 
sition of the Taiwanese direct investment in ASEAN has many implications 
for the pattern of technology transfer to Southeast Asian countries. I shall 
return to this point in section 9.5 below. 
9.3.2 The Pattern of Korea’s Direct Investment in ASEAN 
South Korea began direct investment abroad in 1968 when it undertook a 
project to procure lumber in Indonesia. Until 1985, however, the levels of 
8.  Direct investment in Vietnam from Asian NIEs and other sources is analyzed in TIii~i 
(1991a). 
9 .  In the case of the Philippines, data in table 9.8 unfortunately do not show investments from 
Taiwan. According to the data from JETRO (1992, 216), however, out of 50.8 billion pesos of 
cumulative FDI (on an approval basis) from 1988 to 1990, Taiwan ranked second, with 17.4 
percent of the total, preceded by Japan (25.3 percent) and followed by the United States (14.8 
percent). 
In the data for Indonesia, FDI in the mining sector is not included. The result is that the shares 
of Taiwan and Korea in table 9.8 tend to be overestimated since they have undertaken almost no 
direct investment in the oil exploration and other mining industries in Indonesia. I owe this point 
to Hal Hill. For details, see Hill (1988). 
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Table 9.6 Structure of Taiwan’s FDI: Cumulative Investment from 1959 to 1987 
(thousand U.S. dollars) 
Other 
ASEAN U.S. Regions Total 
Primary industries 638 . . .  4,659 5,297 
Manufacturing: 
(.7) (8.4) (1.4) 
Light industries 42,421 24,151 12,706 79,278 
(49.2) (10.4) (23.0) (21.2) 
Electrical and electronic prods. 9,738 1 16,406 6,293 132,432 
(11.3) (49.9) (11.4) (35.4) 
Other manufacturing 26,040 40,051 12,932 71,851 
(30.2) (17.2) (23.4) (19.2) 
Construction and tertiary indus- 7,306 52,606 18,636 78,548 
tries ( 8 . 5 )  (22.6) (33.7) (21.2) 
Total 86,143 233,214 55,226 374,583 
( 100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) 
Source: Compiled from Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Investment Commission, 
Statistics on Overseas Chinese and Foreign Investment, Technical Cooperation, Outward Invest- 
ment, Outward Technical Cooperation (December 1988, 1989, 1990). 
Note: Figures in parentheses are industry shares in total investment within each region. “ASEAN’ 
excludes Brunei. “Light industries” includes food and beverages, textiles, garments and foot- 
wear, lumber and bamboo products, pulp and paper products, leather and fur products, and 
plastics and rubber products. 
Table 9.7 Structure of Taiwan’s FDI: Cumulative Investment from 1988 to 1990 
(thousand U.S. dollars) 
Other 
ASEAN U.S.  Regions Total 
Primary industries 
All manufacturing 
Light industries 
Electrical and electronic prod- 
Other manufacturing 
ucts 
Construction and tertiary industries 
Total 
5,738 
(0.6) 
855,778 
(94.2) 
151,656 
(16.7) 
356,150 
(39.2) 
347,972 
(38.3) 
46,649 
(5.1) 
908,626 
(100.0) 
0 
( .O)  
712,537 
(67.2) 
189,500 
(17.9) 
173,067 
(16.3) 
349,970 
(33.0) 
348,220 
(32.8) 
1,060,757 
(100.0) 
300 
(.O) 
82,766 
(11.4) 
11,512 
(1.6) 
56,031 
(7.7) 
15,223 
(2.1) 
644,623 
(88.6) 
727,689 
( 100.0) 
6,038 
( 3  
1,65 1,092 
(61.1) 
35 2,668 
(13.1) 
585,259 
(21.7) 
713,165 
(26.4) 
1,044,799 
(38.7) 
2,701,929 
(100.0) 
Source: The same as table 9.6. 
Note: See table 9.6. 
Table 9.8 Major Suppliers of Direct Investment in Asian Countries (million U.S. dollars) 
Suppliers 
West South Hong 
Recipient Countries Total Japan U.S. U.K. Holland Germany Korea Taiwan Kong Singapore 
Investment stock at the end of 1987: 
Thailand 11,536 
( 100.0) 
Malaysia 4,200 
(100.0) 
Indonesia 17,284 
(100.0) 
Philippines 2,830 
(100.0) 
Thailand (1988-89) 7,868 
(100.0) 
Malaysia (1988-89190) 3,690 
(100.0) 
Indonesia (1988-89) 11,159 
(100.0) 
Philippines (1988-89) 275 
(100.0) 
Cumulative investment in recent years: 
2,773 
(24.0) 
1,741 
(41.5) 
5,928 
(34.3) 
377 
(13.3) 
4,431 
(56.3) 
967 
(26.2) 
1,304 
(11.7) 
71 
(25.8) 
1,910 
( 1  6.6) 
202 
(4.8) 
1,244 
(7.2) 
1,620 
(57.2) 
570 
179 
(4.8) 
783 
(7.0) 
98 
(35.6) 
(7.2) 
65 1 
(5.6) 
879 
(20.9) 
560 
(3.2) 
102 
(3.6) 
422 
(3.7) 
61 
(1.5) 
85 1 
(4.9) 
130 
(4.6) 
. . .  
222 
(1.3) 
. . .  
675 
(5.9) 
34 
(.8) 
144 
(.9) 
. . .  
530 
(6.7) 
1,314 
(35.6) 
1,126 
(10.1) 
445 
(3.9) 
262 
(6.2) 
1,876 
(10.9) 
. . .  
278 
(3.5) 
138 
(3.7) 
867 
(7.8) 
35 1 
594 
(14.1) 
299 
(1.7) 
(3.0) 
. . .  
408 
(5.2) 
23 1 
(6.3) 
489 
(4.4) 
~~ ~~~~ ~ ~~ 
Source: Calculated from JETRO data. 
Note: Original data for Thailand and Malaysia are in local currencies. The following exchange rates have been used for conversion: U.S. $1.00 = 25.07 baht 
= 2.49 ringgit at the end of 1987; and U.S. $1.00 = 25.7 baht = 2.7 ringgit for 1989 (annual averages). For data on Indonesia, see n. 9 of the text. Ellipses 
points indicate marginal or zero. 
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Korean FDI were small, and investments tended to be concentrated in re- 
source development and in commerce and other service sectors aimed at facil- 
itating export activities. 
Since the mid-l980s, Korean FDI has been characterized by rapid expan- 
sion and by the increasing participation of manufacturing industries. The cu- 
mulative FDI for the latest four years (1986-89) amounted to U.S. $968 mil- 
lion, which was twice the cumulative FDI from 1968 to 1985 (U.S. $476 
million). The manufacturing sector accounted for only 17 percent of invest- 
ment stock at the end of 1985, but this share rose to an average of 39 percent 
during the period 1987-89. As will be seen below, the share of the manufac- 
turing sector has been even higher for Korean FDI in ASEAN countries. 
The factors accounting for the expansion of Korean manufacturing FDI 
since the second half of the 1980s are almost the same as in the case of Tai- 
wan: a sharp rise in real wages, a revaluation of the local currency against the 
U.S. dollar, and trade conflict with the most important export market, the 
United States. 
Recent trends in Korean direct investment in ASEAN are summarized in 
tables 9.9 and 9.10. These data illustrate the following features. First, for 
most ASEAN countries, substantial Korean direct investment began in the 
most recent two years. In particular, Korea’s investment in Thailand and In- 
donesia was marginal before 1987. Second, with the exception of Indonesia, 
almost all direct investment in ASEAN has been in manufacturing industries 
(table 9.9). 
Third, within the manufacturing sector, Korean firms tend to invest either 
in labor-intensive industries, such as foodstuffs, textiles and apparel, footwear 
and leather, wood and furniture, and other miscellaneous products, or in 
resource-intensive products, such as chemicals, nonferrous products, and fab- 
ricated metals (table 9.10). The first group of industries accounts for about 54 
percent of the investment in Thailand, 8 1 percent in Indonesia, and 60 percent 
in the Philippines. The share of the second group of industries is high in 
resource-rich Malaysia. None of the ASEAN countries have received substan- 
tial direct investment from Korea’s electrical and electronics industry. 
These observations suggest that the pattern of Korean FDI in ASEAN has 
been almost the same as that of Taiwan: expansion in recent years and concen- 
tration in labor-intensive and technologically standardized industries. In ad- 
dition, the average size of investment projects undertaken in ASEAN by Tai- 
wan, Korea, and other Asian NIEs has been much smaller than that of projects 
undertaken by Japan (Ramstetter 1988; Thee 1990).1° 
10. Some Korean and Taiwanese firms undertaking FDI in ASEAN countries may be Japanese 
affiliates in those two Asian NIEs. At the moment, however, I cannot confirm this point. However, 
whether they are Japanese affiliates or pure Korean and Taiwanese firms, my argument is not 
significantly affected. Even if these firms were Japanese affiliates, their technologies should have 
been adapted to fit the NIEs’ factor endowments. In addition, the management style and other 
intangible assets of those affiliates may have been largely localized since Japanese ownership in 
joint ventures in Korea and Taiwan has generally been as a minority. For the case of Korea, see, 
e.g., Koo (1985, 186-88). 
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Table 9.9 Korea’s Manufacturing Direct Investment in ASEAN (thousand U.S. 
dollars) 
Thailand Indonesia Malaysia Philippines 
1973-85 1,871 11.993 26,488 2,009 
1986 45 . . .  588 . . .  
1987 997 2,349 240 2,062 
19xx 16,098 23,144 3,301 4,529 
1989 13,363 76,383 33,858 8,758 
1973-89 32,374 114,469 64,475 17,358 
% of total 99.1 33.0 97.1 98.8 
Source: Compiled from data in Rhee (1990). Original data were released by the Bank of Korea. 
Note: “% of total” means share of manufacturing in total direct investment in all industries. 
Table 9.10 Industry Composition of Korea’s Manufacturing Investment in 
ASEAN (outstanding investment stock as of the end of 1989) 
(thousand U.S. dollars) 
Thailand Indonesia Malaysia Philippines 
Foodstuffs 
Textiles and ap- 
parel 
Footwear and 
leather 
Wood and furniture 
Paper 
Chemicals 
Nonferrous prod- 
Primary metals 
Fabricated metals 
Other 
Total 
ucts 
2,903 
3,684 
. . .  
2,118 
45 
12,770 
10,854 
32,314 
25,685 
22,432 
22,840 
8,120 
1,520 
10,190 
. . .  
1,278 
8,852 
13,552 
114,469 
. . .  
2,754 
10,383 
25,062 
565 
25,145 
566 
64,475 
6,723 
2,809 
. . .  
5,894 
932 
17,358 
Source: See table 9.9 
9.4 The Asian Pacific Region as a Market for New Flows of 
Technologies: The Pull Factors 
The analysis in preceding sections showed that, since the latter half of the 
1980s, the Asian Pacific countries have seen intensive flows of production 
technologies, management skills, and marketing skills. These flows of tech- 
nologies have been due not only to push factors, such as rising factor costs 
and rapid appreciation of currencies in the home countries of suppliers (as 
mentioned in secs. 9.2 and 9.3 above), but also to pull factors in the host 
countries. In other words, the reasons why Japanese and NIE firms have cho- 
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sen the Asian Pacific region as a market for their managerial resources are also 
important. The pull factors in this region can be summarized as follows. 
First, the absorptive capacity in Asia has increased considerably. The ca- 
pacity for technology absorption may be defined as a synthesis of the edu- 
cational and skill levels of the labor force, the availability of local entrepre- 
neurship, and the government’s ability to maintain a stable political and mac- 
roeconomic environment. ‘ I  
Table 9.11 suggests a steady improvement in the educational levels of most 
Asian Pacific countries. It is noteworthy that Korea has by now achieved the 
same educational level as Japan in terms of both high school and postsecond- 
ary enrollment ratios. And, by the mid- 1980s, the high school enrollment 
ratios of most ASEAN countries reached the levels attained by Asian NIEs in 
the early 1970s. These achievements in education have undoubtedly boosted 
the capacity of Asian developing countries to absorb foreign technologies. As 
Rosenberg ( 1982, 247-49) argued, historically, the countries that were most 
successful at borrowing technology were those that had well-educated popu- 
lations. 
For other indicators of absorptive capacity, no direct and objective evidence 
can be shown. However, the perception of technology suppliers itself can sug- 
gest to some extent the absorptive capacity of host countries. For example, 
the positive response of Japanese firms in providing technologies through the 
OEM channel to Asian NIEs shows their recognition of the technological and 
management levels of firms in those countries. Regarding the policies of host 
countries, the capacity continuously to provide a politically and economically 
stable market environment is critical since this ensures the firms that they are 
not operating in a risky market; thus, they are more willing to make long-term 
investments, including human resource development. This relates to the sec- 
ond pull factor. 
Second, the investment climate in the Asian Pacific region has been much 
more attractive, in terms of political and economic stability, than that in other 
developing parts of the world. In addition, the environment of the region as a 
whole has been further improved since the mid-l980s, in the sense that the 
favorable market conditions for foreign investment have spread from one 
1 I ,  The increase in absorptive capacity by grading up the educational and technological level 
of the labor force is emphasized by Sekiguchi (1986), among others. Tran (1988) analyzed how 
Korea’s synthetic fiber firms have increased their absorptive capacity and gradually substituted 
their own capital and technology for foreign resources. At the firm and government levels, the 
statement made by Vernon (1989, 36-37) is suggestive: “Some of the most critical factors in the 
successful transfer and application of technology are internal to the receiver of the technology: 
Internal to the country in terms of the economic and regulatory environment, internal to the firms 
in terms of the capacities, incentives, and attitudes of managers and technicians, and internal to 
the industrial structure of the country.” 
12. In its issue of 27 March 1991, the Japan Economic Journal (Nihon keizai shinbun) con- 
ducted a survey on the perception of top management of Japanese, American, and European firms. 
According to the results of the survey, the Asian Pacific countries will be considered as a promis- 
ing investment region in the future, owing mainly to the high quality of the labor force. 
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Table 9.11 Educational Level of Asian Countries 
1965 1970 1975 1980 1984 1986 
Japan: 
A 
B 
Korea: 
A 
B 
A 
B 
A 
B 
A 
B 
A 
B 
A 
B 
A 
B 
China: 
A 
B 
Hong Kong: 
Singapore: 
Thailand: 
Philippines: 
Malaysia: 
Indonesia: 
86 
12.9 
91 
17.0 
93 
30.5 
95 
29.6 
96 
28.8 
91 
24.6 
34 
6.2 
41 
7.9 
56 
9.6 
76 
15.0 
91 
29.4 
95 
32.9 
34 
5.4 
41 
7.4 
49 
10.1 
64 
10.5 
69 
12.8 
49 
9.9 
46 
6.8 
52 
9.0 
58 
7.8 
71 
11.P 
. . .  
. . .  
11 
1.5 
16 
2.7 
26 
3.4 
29 
13.1 
31 
22.5a 
29 
19.6b 
41 
18.8 
49 
19.8 
54 
18.4 
65 
27.7 
68 
34. I 
68 
3 8b 
27 
1.9 
34 
I .6 
44 
2.8 
48 
4.3 
53 
6.1 
54 
6.0b 
12 
1.5 
12 
2.8 
20 
2.4 
29 
3.9 
39 
6.5 
41 
46 
.6 
46 
1.3 
37 
1.4 
42 
I .7 
Source: Compiled from Unesco, Statistical Yearbook. 
Note: A: high school enrollment ratio; B: postsecondary enrollment ratio. Ellipses points indicate 
that figures are not available. 
'1983. 
b1985. 
c1981. 
country to another and the area with a favorable investment climate has been 
expanded. In the region under review, we have witnessed that this area has 
expanded from the NIEs to Thailand in the mid-1980s (Chee 1988) to Indo- 
nesia (Thee 1990), and to Vietnam toward the end of the decade (Tran 1991a). 
Government efforts to improve the investment climate may stem from a 
type of demonstration effect in the Asian Pacific region. The successful intro- 
duction of foreign managerial resources in a country may encourage neigh- 
boring countries to adopt similar policies to improve market conditions. The 
changes in external economic policies in Indonesia and Vietnam in the late 
1980s, for example, may in part be explained by the demonstration effect 
from NIEs and Thailand. 
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Third, the Asian Pacific economy has experienced a rapid growth in the 
past three decades, and, given its current political stability and economic po- 
tential, the region has been considered as a growth center of the world. This 
has generated strong expectations among investors about the opportunities the 
region will provide. In addition, research on and international conferences 
about the region’s economy have been intensively conducted. These activities 
contribute to the diffusion of knowledge and information about the economic 
situation and potential of the region and thus reduce the uncertainties of in- 
vestment. 
Fourth, the cost of the transfer of technology among the countries in the 
Asian Pacific region can be considered as small. The cost of transfer is not the 
cost of technology (the licensing fee) itself but a cost generated in the process 
of transferring a technology from one country to another. This includes com- 
munication (telephone, telex, etc.) costs, travel costs (for personnel in charge 
of the transfer project), and wages paid to the engineers and experts who help 
the transferees until the project begins its operations. According to Teece 
(1977), such transfer costs amount to 19 percent of the total cost (including 
the licensing fee) of the project. 
Owing to geographic proximity and cultural affinities, the transfer cost of 
technologies provided by Japanese and NIE firms to other countries in the 
region can be considered as small, when compared to transferring technolo- 
gies to other regions. In addition, for Japanese firms such costs may have 
declined over time owing to the learning effects of their previous FDI and 
other technology transfers in the region. For Taiwanese investors, the overseas 
Chinese networks in Southeast Asia enable them to reduce transfer costs. 
Among these pull factors, the most important may be the second one. Po- 
litical and economic stability is a precondition for firms to undertake FDI. 
Other factors promote and accelerate such investment. That is why after the 
Tien-an-men Square incident (June 1989), FDI in China has declined. 
To be sure, the United States and some Western European countries have 
also become major markets for Japanese and NIE direct investment. These 
countries have indeed provided many pull factors, attracting FDI from East 
Asia. However, the Asian Pacific region is the single developing area of the 
world that has absorbed intensive flows of technology and other managerial 
resources from Japan and the NIEs. What implications will this fact hold for 
future economic development in the region? 
9.5 Technology Ransfer and Asian Pacific Dynamism: Implications of 
Recent %ends 
The analysis in preceding sections suggests that, since the latter half of the 
1980s, the Asian Pacific countries have seen intensive flows of production 
technologies, management skills, and marketing skills. Not only has the 
amount of managerial resources increased substantially, but the types of these 
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resources have also been highly diverse. They include high technologies from 
Japan’s electrical/electronics and other machinery-related industries, mana- 
gerial resources from Japanese SMSFs, and labor-intensive technologies from 
Asian NIEs. The NIEs have increasingly played the role of both suppliers (of 
labor-intensive and standardized technologies) and recipients (of relatively so- 
phisticated technologies from Japan), while ASEAN countries have been in a 
position to absorb various types of managerial resources. 
From the economic development perspective of the Asian Pacific region, 
we may draw two implications from the trends in technology transfer since 
the second half of the 1980s. The first implication relates to the quantity or 
the amount of the flows of technologies, and the second one relates to the 
content or the structure of those flows. 
9.5.1 Promotion of Industrialization by Intensive Flows of Technologies 
The industrialization or economic development of a country is the result of 
many efforts, efforts that are not only economic but also political and social. 
Considering only the economic aspects, we can identify many indicators that 
determine the rate of economic growth. Saving and investment may be the 
most direct and important factors, as the Harrod-Domer model suggests. In- 
dustrial and trade policies are other areas that determine the success or failure 
of economic development. However, the experience of Japan, as well as that 
of Korea and Taiwan, also suggests the important role of foreign technologies 
in the industrialization process, even though, depending on policies and gen- 
eral technological levels in each country, the extent of that role and the chan- 
nels utilized have been different. 
The scope of this paper does not allow a detailed analysis of this point. I 
simply argue as follows. The importation of foreign technologies contributes 
to the process and the product innovations of recipient countries. The innova- 
tions have the following effects on economic development. On the macro 
level, the innovations result in an upward shift of the production function, 
which increases the rate of growth more than that of production factors. More- 
over, some studies of the Japanese experience showed that the importation of 
technologies has enhanced domestic investment. This relates to the micro- 
economic effect of innovations. The availability of technologies enables the 
start of new industries. The importation of management skills or new organi- 
zational methods contributes to improvements in the operation of existing in- 
dustries. 
With these qualifications, we may say that the technology transfers from 
abroad cannot be a starter, but they can be promoters of industrialization in a 
country. Therefore, given the increasing absorptive capacity of Asian Pacific 
countries, the intensive flows of technologies since the mid-1980s may further 
enhance industrialization in the region. In addition, given the new features of 
Japanese FDI discussed in section 9.2 above, two related implications can be 
drawn here. First, since most new Japanese FDI projects have been export 
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oriented, the implication is that new direct investment from Japan will con- 
tribute to the development of internationally competitive industries for Asian 
countries. 
Second, since the mid-l980s, Japanese firms have invested in a wide range 
of industries. In particular, capital goods, intermediate goods, and parts- 
producing investment projects have increased substantially. This new feature 
is expected to upgrade, deepen, and broaden the industrial structure of Asian 
Pacific countries. Their industrial structure is expected to be much more so- 
phisticated, and further industrialization in the region will be facilitated by 
new investments from Japan. 
9.5.2 Facilitation of Asia’s Further Industrialization by Increasing 
Availability of Various Levels of Technologies 
Trends since the latter half of the 1980s also suggest that a wide range of 
different technologies is increasingly available in the Asian Pacific region. In 
particular, for ASEAN countries and other latecomers to industrialization in 
the region, many options for technology transfer have been provided, in terms 
of both supply sources of technology and channels of transfer. In this context, 
the increasingly strong presence of SMSFs and Asian NIEs as new sources of 
technologies is particularly noteworthy. This point reminds us of the argument 
regarding South-South technology transfer in the context of “appropriate tech- 
nology” or the concept of an “optimal technological gap” stressed by Chen 
(1985). 
The South-South technology transfer hypothesis suggests that the technol- 
ogies transferred-usually from advanced southern countries to less devel- 
oped southern countries-are more appropriate since the gap in factor endow- 
ments among southern countries is much smaller than that between North and 
South. The technologies developed and transferred by northern SMSFs also 
have the same characteristics. Those technologies are usually labor intensive, 
standardized, and used in small-scale operations. Thus, technologies trans- 
ferred from SMSFs tend to fit the factor endowments of recipient southern 
countries. 
The concept of an optimal technological gap is a modification of the con- 
cept technological gap suggested by Gerschenkron (1 962)’s “advantages of 
backwardness” hypothesis. According to the technological gap argument, the 
greater the relative disparity in development level between a less developed 
country and more advanced countries, the faster the rate at which the former 
can catch up. In other words, the rate of technical progress in a relatively 
backward country is an increasing function of the gap between its own level 
of technology and that of the advanced countries. However, if the gap is too 
large, catching up may be impossible since the difference in technological 
capability is so great that the backward country cannot possibly apply or dif- 
fuse the advanced technology. For this reason, Chen (1985) suggested the con- 
cept of an optimal technological gap. If the gap is within a certain appropriate 
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range, the rate of technical change in the backward region tends to rise rapidly, 
but the rate will decline along with further expansion of the gap. The level at 
which the rate of catching up is maximized is the optimal level. 
In explaining the continuous spread of industrialization in the Asian Pacific 
region in the past twenty-five years or so, Kosai (1990, 6-7) pointed to three 
factors, of which the second is, interestingly, similar to the “optimal techno- 
logical gap” argument: “( 1) The demonstration effect of one country’s contin- 
uous and easy-to-follow development patterns contributed to that of neighbor- 
ing countries. ( 2 )  Reasonably varying degree of differences in economic levels 
among countries in the region meant each country can easily set a goal, and 
that the chances of catching-up, and the benefits to be expected from catching 
up were high. (3) The countries being chased took the development of the late 
comers as a challenge, and the competition spurred them on to further their 
own development” (my italics). 
From the above discussion, we may hypothesize that the increasing role of 
SMSFs and Asian NIEs as suppliers of technologies will facilitate further 
industrialization in the region. In particular, intensive transfer of such tech 
nologies will help the development of the wide range of small-scale, 
labor-intensive industries (parts, peripheral products, and other supporting in- 
dustries) that support the development of large-scale, capital intensive, and 
technologically sophisticated industries. The promotion of the development 
of such supporting industries will strengthen the industrial foundation of 
ASEAN countries and other latecomers in the region. 
At the microeconomic level, not all firms within a single country, particu- 
larly a relatively large economy that has reached some level of industrializa- 
tion, have the same level of technology. Most of the members of ASEAN are 
now countries of this type. In these countries, some relatively large firms, 
which have accumulated substantial managerial resources, including a large, 
highly qualified labor force, can efficiently absorb high technologies trans- 
ferred from large Japanese firms. 
In a word, the Asian Pacific region now has access to various sources of 
technologies. Combined with the increasing absorptive capacity of the coun- 
tries in the region, the new trends in technology transfer since the latter half 
of the 1980s are likely to facilitate and promote further industrialization in 
this region. 
9.6 Concluding Remarks 
This paper has not touched on some other important aspects of technology 
transfer in the Asian Pacific region, such as transfer from the United States 
and other non-Japanese advanced sources, licensing arrangements, plant ex- 
port, and other non-FDI channels of technology transfer from Asian NIEs. 
The technology transfer from Japan and the NIEs to China has also not been 
dealt with in detail. However, the paper has highlighted some important new 
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trends relating to the issues under review. These include the intensive flows of 
technology through various channels from Japan and more recently from 
Asian NIEs and the multilayered structure of technological flows involving 
Japan’s technology-intensive industries, small-scale projects by Japanese 
SMSFs, and labor-intensive industries from Asian NIEs. Combined with the 
increasing absorptive capacity of recipient countries, the new trends in tech- 
nology transfer serve to facilitate further industrialization in the Asian Pacific 
region. 
Economic development in the Asian Pacific region in the past twenty-five 
years or so can be viewed as a catching-up process by latecomers to industrial- 
ization. Korea, Taiwan, and other NIEs have attempted to catch up with Japan 
since the 1960s, starting with labor-intensive industries and then expanding 
to capital and technology-intensive industries. ASEAN countries and China 
have more recently joined this process by attempting to catch up with Asian 
NIEs in industries producing labor-intensive products. With the new trends in 
technology transfer discussed above, we may expect that such a multilayered 
pursuit process will be further promoted in the 1990s. Given the current eco- 
nomic reforms and open-door policy in Vietnam and the positive response of 
Asian NIEs to the country’s new foreign investment law (Tran 1991a), it is 
very likely that Vietnam will join this multilayered pursuit process as part of 
the lower stratum of the region’s industrialization. 
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Comment Takatoshi It0 
Tran Van Tho’s paper describes and analyzes technological transfers from Ja- 
pan and from Korea and Taiwan to Asian countries. The paper serves four 
purposes. First, it describes “facts,” namely, types of technological transfers 
(FDI, licensing arrangements, OEM), time series of FDI, destinations of FDI, 
FDI by industry, and size of firms. Second, the paper attempts to analyze 
reasons for those facts. Third, FDI from Korea and Taiwan to other Asian 
countries is documented. Fourth, the paper derives implications for economic 
growth from technological transfer. It is a nice paper, highlighting Japanese 
investment in Asia. 
This paper documents FDI, licensing arrangements, and OEM, with an im- 
plicit assumption that they represent technological transfers. However, FDI 
etc. are only proxies of technological transfers and may not be necessary or 
sufficient for technological transfers in a rigorous sense: even if factories are 
built, the Japanese management may not be willing to train workers in a host 
nation (a frequently heard complaint); and, even if a factory is not built, tech- 
nical assistance could be sent so that know-how may be provided. The reader 
should be reminded of this qualification. 
Tran’s paper invokes many interesting questions. I feel that the following 
issues deserve more attention in future research on Japanese foreign direct 
investment. 
Obviously, there may be conflicts between Japanese firms and host coun- 
tries. Japanese firms may want to limit technological transfers by not training 
managers or by refusing to reveal contents of key components. Japanese firms 
may also restrict the sales of assembled goods, preventing them from coming 
back to the Japanese market to harm the parent company. (An example is that 
a Japanese electronics company put restrictions on sales to the U.S. market 
when it provided technology for videocassette recorders.) On the other hand, 
recipient countries would want to maximize transfers by restricting the type 
of FDI. They may allow joint ventures, barring 100 percent subsidiaries; they 
may insist on a licensing agreement. 
In other words, Japanese (or Korean and Taiwanese) parent firms maximize 
their profits by FDI (limiting the amount of transfers), while the recipient 
countries maximize their profits by learning (sometimes copying or stealing) 
technologies. Hence, technological transfers have to be placed in the context 
of a trade-off between these two possibly conflicting maximizing agents. How 
are these conflicts resolved in the actual cases of East Asian countries? 
Reasons why FDI to Asia increased rapidly should be discussed in a sepa- 
rate section, carefully differentiating “pull factors” and “push factors”: 
(i) looking for cheap and abundant labor; (ii) exchange rates; (iii) political 
stability; (iv) economic stability; (v) educational level; and (vi) changes in 
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regulations concerning capital controls. The reader should ponder which ones 
were most important. Note that some of the push and pull factors may have a 
multiplier effect. Technological transfers enhance economic progress, which 
in turn yields political progress. Note that Japanese FDI to the United States 
increased more than FDI to Asian countries. 
As an implication of technological transfers, the paper points out that tech- 
nological transfers propel industrialization. However, technological transfers 
are only one factor in industrialization. Saving and investment and monetary 
and fiscal policies may be more important. One important question in the 
theory of economic development is how great a difference technological trans- 
fers make. Would such transfers make growth faster, allowing foreign capital 
to come in (with, one hopes, technological transfers)? Or would it be better in 
the long run to nurture domestic infant industries (avoiding “rents” being si- 
phoned out)? Korea’s development seems to have more of the former element 
than Japan’s did. 
Comment Bih Jane Liu 
Foreign direct investment and technology transfer have not been the focus of 
my research for the past several years. Thus, as the commentator on this very 
interesting and informative paper, I shall only mention several points that 
might need further clarification. 
The first question is related to the relation between foreign direct invest- 
ment and technology transfer. In this paper, the author uses the amount of 
foreign direct investment as the proxy for the amount of technology transfer 
that comes along with foreign direct investment. This usage might create in- 
accuracy problems because the extent of technology transfer that could be 
brought up with foreign direct investment also depends on other factors such 
as the attitude of investors toward technology transfer. 
According to table 9.6, the accumulated amount of foreign direct invest- 
ment from Taiwan to Southeast Asia is U.S. $86 million for the period 1959- 
87. But other data sources indicate that the investment in Thailand alone by 
Taiwan in 1987 had already reached U.S. $299 million. This wide difference 
might imply that the investment data used in this paper are seriously underes- 
timated. This underestimation, I suspect, comes from the utilization of the 
investment data collected by the Investment Commission of the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, and the Investment Commission’s data are widely believed 
to be underestimated. This is because, unlike large Taiwanese investors, who 
tend to report their foreign investments to the Investment Commission in or- 
der to get assistance for their foreign endeavors, small Taiwanese investors 
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are reluctant to report such investments since the review process is time con- 
suming. 
Tran argues that, according to the South-South technology transfer hypoth- 
esis and the theory of the optimal technological gap, increasing participation 
in foreign direct investment by small and medium-sized Asian firms is to the 
advantage of Asian developing countries in their pursuit of technology trans- 
fer and industrialization. However, on the contrary, it could also be argued 
that small and medium-sized firms, when compared with large firms, are often 
more conservative in transferring technology, which, in any case, may not 
embody the latest standards and designs that host countries seek. This means 
that the increasing participation of small and medium-sized firms in foreign 
direct investment might not be as helpful as the author expected in speeding 
technology transfer and thus the industrialization of Asian developing coun- 
tries. As a matter of fact, the increasing participation of small and medium- 
sized firms in foreign direct investment was driven by their smaller profit mar- 
gins, and investment abroad seems to be the direct solution to their increasing 
labor costs and the appreciation of their own currencies. 
It seems to me that the author has been quite optimistic about the contribu- 
tion of technology transfer to the industrialization of host countries. However, 
this contribution depends not only on the labor quality of the host countries, 
as the author has emphasized in this paper, but also on the backward and 
forward linkage effects and dynamic externalities such as learning by doing or 
learning by producing. Without these linkage effects and dynamic externali- 
ties, we might have the case proposed by McCulloch and Yellen (1982). That 
is, when one country enjoys clear technological superiority in one sector 
while in others its technology is the same as other countries, then capital mo- 
bility between these two countries can serve as a substitute for technology 
transfer. This implies that, as long as capital is perfectly mobile internation- 
ally, the extent of technology transfer has no effect on employment, income 
distribution, or national welfare. In such an extreme case, intensive inflows of 
technology are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for further indus- 
trialization, that is, not as the author has asserted. 
Finally, one issue that has not been mentioned clearly in this paper is the 
resemblance of foreign investment patterns between Japan and other Asian 
newly industrialized economies (NIEs). It was observed that Taiwan and 
South Korea were basically following the earlier patterns of Japanese foreign 
investments. However, we do not know whether such resemblances in invest- 
ment patterns between Japan and Asian NIEs still exist in the 1980s. Another 
interesting phenomenon left unexplained in this paper is that, according to 
table 9.2, the share of foreign direct investment by Asian NIEs in manufactur- 
ing industries is decreasing while the share of Japan is increasing. 
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